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Natural Law and Evolutionary 
Conservatism: Comments on                      
Janet Radcliffe Richards 
MATT ZWOLINSKI* 
I. 
What role should appeals to human nature play in debates about social 
institutions such as marriage?  James Fitzjames Stephen thinks that what 
is natural is, in some sense, morally good.  Janet Radcliffe Richards disagrees, 
arguing that Stephen’s view is a relic of an antiquated metaphysics that 
ought to have perished in the wake of a Darwinian understanding of the 
world.1
I am not willing to defend Stephen’s position on this debate as such.  
And I certainly would not wish to defend his more concrete views on 
marriage and the sexes.  But I think that Radcliffe Richards neglects a 
more reasonable way of developing a conservative, natural law position 
which, while perhaps not clearly articulated by Stephen himself, is 
similar enough in both methodology and output to warrant our attention.  
This form of conservatism, partially articulated by Edmund Burke, 
Friedrich Hayek, and many others in between, involves viewing social 
and political institutions as themselves the continually developing products 
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of a kind of Darwinian evolution.2  To view them in this light is not to 
view them as morally sacrosanct.  But it is to view them as having at 
least a kind of prima facie moral authority.  It is, however, a moral 
authority which derives from epistemological considerations, rather than 
metaphysical ones.  What is natural is morally authoritative, on this 
view, not because it bears the imprint of a divine creator, nor because it 
contains the unchangeable essence of a natural order, but rather because 
the process by which it has emerged is the product of a collective 
wisdom and experience that far outreaches our own. 
II. 
Stephen appealed to the alleged natural inferiority of women to justify 
their subordinate role in marriage.3  In response, many contemporary 
defenders of women’s rights have denied the relevancy of appeals to 
nature at all.  Differences between the sexes, they say, are not natural, 
but socially constructed.  By nature, the sexes are equal, and therefore 
social institutions such as marriage should reflect this equality. 
Radcliffe Richards finds this argument troubling.  Specifically, she is 
concerned about a premise which seems to be common to both conservatives 
such as Stephen and their feminist opponents—that if something is natural, 
it is good, and our social institutions ought not attempt to subvert it.4  This 
idea, says Radcliffe Richards, may have made sense on the Aristotelean 
or Christian worldview, but it no longer does in a post-Darwinian age.5  
We now know that organisms do not evolve to fulfill any grand cosmic 
purpose.  There is nothing morally virtuous about conformity to nature as 
such.  Nature, in Radcliffe Richards’ words, often leaves us with a “moral 
mess,” and it is our job to clean up that mess as best we can.6
But this does not mean that appeals to nature are of no value to moral 
argument.  On the contrary, to know what we have to clean up, we have 
to know what nature is.  Appeals to human nature are thus of the highest 
relevance in political argument, for it is only with an accurate understanding 
of that nature that we can come to understand the objective function 
served by social institutions such as marriage, and only then that we can 
begin to shape our purposeless world to serve our purposes.  Our nature 
may be fixed, but our social and political institutions are not.  And since 
there is nothing morally authoritative in nature as such, we ought to 
 2. F.A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A 
FREE PEOPLE 167 (1979). 
 3. STEPHEN, supra note 1. 
 4. Radcliffe Richards, supra note 1, at 1129–30. 
 5. Id. at 1139–40. 
 6. Id. at 1142. 
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change our institutions so as to remedy or compensate for nature’s moral 
defects whenever we can. 
III. 
On its face, then, the disagreement between Radcliffe Richards and 
Stephen really does look like a metaphysical one.  Stephen holds that the 
natural is normative and ought to be preserved and protected, while 
Radcliffe Richards holds that something’s being natural has no bearing 
at all on its moral desirability.7  But a conservative like Stephen can hold 
that nature is normative without holding that it is intrinsically normative.  
A more reasonable position, I think, is to hold that nature is normative 
because it imposes constraints upon our ability to shape our world.  
When it comes to human social institutions, what is “natural” is what has 
been widely and regularly practiced for a significant amount of time.  
And there’s good reason to think that anything that has that sort of 
pedigree has done a pretty good job of serving human purposes.  The 
fact that a social institution has been “selected” by an evolutionary 
process is evidence (albeit defeasible evidence) of its “fitness.” 
There is, furthermore, at least some reason to assume that institutions 
which emerge from such an evolutionary process do a better job than any 
alternative institution we could come up with.  As Radcliffe Richards points 
out, the task of institutional evaluation is one which requires more than 
merely looking at the results produced by an institution.  It requires 
looking at the difference between the results that institution produces and 
the results that alternative institutions would produce.  Knowledge of the 
nature of an institution thus requires knowledge of various sorts of 
counterfactuals—counterfactuals about what would happen under the 
current institution if people made choices other than the ones they 
actually made, and counterfactuals about what would happen under other 
institutional arrangements. 
But knowledge of this sort of counterfactual is very hard to come by, 
especially when we consider major institutional reform.  Early twentieth-
century Bolsheviks had very little idea what the results would be of their 
early experiments with the complete abolition of all market mechanisms.8 
 7. STEPHEN, supra note 1, at 192; Radcliffe Richards, supra note 1, at 1139. 
 8. That this must be so is shown partially by the fact that key actors at the time of 
the revolution made incompatible predictions regarding its ultimate end.  For a detailed 
examination of some of the conflicting visions of the Bolshevik revolutionaries, see 
generally RICHARD PIPES, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION (1995). 




Economists today have a great deal of difficulty predicting the results of 
the ongoing process of globalization.9  And we have very little idea what 
the results would be of abolishing the institution of marriage in a country 
like the contemporary United States. 
Thus, we are in a poor position to know what alternative institutional 
arrangements would be better or worse for our purposes.  But this is only 
half of our epistemological quandary.  Not only do we not know which 
alternative institutions are good or bad, we do not even know what 
makes our own institutions good.  The selection process at work in the 
evolution of social institutions is largely opaque to us, in just the same 
way that the selection process in biological evolution is.  It can be 
obvious from surveying a given ecosystem that one species has achieved 
a high degree of adaptive success.  But discovering what it is about that 
organism which led to its success is a difficult endeavor.  In the same 
way, we can tell by looking at a society which institutions have succeeded, 
but it is far more difficult for us to see why they have succeeded.  The 
dominance of monogamous marriage in the West is evident to anyone 
who opens their eyes.  But whether this dominance is due to the social 
stability it promotes, or the fact that it makes the individuals that partake 
in it happy, or its economic effects, is a matter about which the most 
highly trained social scientists vehemently disagree.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that we cannot see the justification for the institution is poor reason 
to think that there is none. 
A recent theatrical dramatization of the life of Alfred Kinsey illustrates 
almost exactly this point.10  Kinsey, famous for his research on sexual 
behavior in the mid-twentieth century, is portrayed in the film as a 
brilliant scientist—a man of reason leading a revolution against the 
dogmas of tradition.  His scientific work was shown to upset what 
everybody “knew to be true” about sex, and he applied his findings to 
his personal life.  Since he could find no reason why marriages should be 
monogamous, Kinsey decided to have an affair with his male graduate 
student.  In one pivotal scene, he calmly and unashamedly reveals his 
actions to his wife who, in what is a surprise to Kinsey but to no one in 
the audience, takes the news rather badly.  Through tears, she explains to 
her husband the obvious point: his actions hurt her feelings.  Kinsey 
might not have realized that they would do so but, she explains, the 
customary constraints on marital fidelity are there for a reason, even if 
Kinsey—brilliant scientist that he is—can’t see what that reason is.11
 9. For conflicting views of the future of globalization, see JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, 
IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2004) and JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS 
DISCONTENTS (2003). 
 10. KINSEY (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004). 
 11. Id. 
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Friedrich Hayek puts the point in the following way: “[S]ince we owe 
the order of our society to a tradition of rules which we only imperfectly 
understand, all progress must be based on tradition. We must build on 
tradition and can only tinker with its products.”12
Hayek’s position is a conservative one—it seeks to conserve tradition, 
or that which is “naturally” done.  But it is a conservatism based not 
on any peculiar metaphysical assumptions, but rather on a kind of 
epistemological humility.  It is thus a conservatism which bridges the 
gap between the natural law and post-Darwinian worldviews discussed 
by Radcliffe Richards.13  It shares with her the belief that the proper 
standard for evaluating social institutions is their ability to serve human 
purposes.  There is nothing intrinsically moral about that which is 
natural.  But this is not to say that something’s being natural is of no 
moral importance at all.  Its importance lies precisely in its ability to 
serve human purposes.  We might not know how it serves our purposes, 
and we might fancy that some radical alternative institution would serve 
our purposes better.  But we would do well, the conservative argues, to 
be wary of our own ability to evaluate such matters correctly.  The 
process by which our institutions have evolved reflect a degree of 
wisdom and experience which far outreaches our own—it reflects the 
conscious and unconscious decisions of all those who came before us.  
Paradoxically, then, we will better achieve our purposes by not 
attempting to consciously and deliberately mold our institutions to serve 
them.  We would do better to view our own rationality with modesty, 
and to put our confidence in the wisdom of tradition. 
IV. 
This is not the place to engage in a full evaluation of the conservative 
position I have just sketched.  My point was simply to show that the 
difference between conservatives like Stephen and liberals like 
Radcliffe Richards is not necessarily as great as she perceives.  They are 
divided not necessarily by fundamentally different views of the nature of 
the universe, but by more mundane empirical questions regarding the 
extent of our ability to consciously design institutions to serve our 
purposes, and by sometimes subtly differing moral views regarding what 
sort of purposes we want those institutions to serve.  That the gap is not 
 12. HAYEK, supra note 2, at 167. 
 13. See Radcliffe Richards, supra note 1, at 1139. 




unbridgeable is, I should think, welcome news for parties on both sides 
of it. 
Still, it is worth making a few points about the merits of the position I 
have just described, even though I cannot hope to settle the debate here.  
The first point to note is that the moral significance of an institution’s 
having emerged from a process of cultural evolution depends crucially 
on what the selection mechanism of that evolutionary process is.  Why 
do some institutions survive and others fail?  One plausible supposition 
is that some institutions succeed because they contribute to a peaceful, 
stable society.  If this is the selection mechanism at work, then the fact 
that an institution is evolutionary successful is good evidence indeed of 
its moral virtue.  A peaceful, stable society is a morally good thing, so 
any institution which emerges from a process that tends to produce 
institutions conducive to such ends has at least something going for it, 
morally speaking. 
Of course, the fact that it has something going for it does not show 
that it is morally unassailable.  An institution can promote a peaceful, 
stable society while at the same time promoting inequality, oppression, 
and other forms of injustice.  If the injustices it produces are significant 
enough, this might be enough to outweigh whatever virtues the selection 
mechanism tends to yield, and we might then have a strong moral case 
for institutional reform. 
Furthermore, we might be incorrect in assuming that the selection 
mechanism produces any virtues whatsoever.  Perhaps institutions survive 
because they support the interests of the powerful.  The fact that an 
institution has emerged from this kind of selection process, if it tells us 
anything at all about the moral virtue of the institution, tells us that it is 
morally bad. 
The fact that something is natural, then, in the sense of having 
demonstrated fitness in some evolutionary process, does not automatically 
give us reason to morally endorse it.  Whether it does depends on the 
exact nature of the selection mechanism employed by that evolutionary 
process.  And it is far from clear what selection mechanism, or mechanisms, 
are at work in institutional evolution as we find it in the world today. 
The second important point to consider regarding this variety of 
conservatism is related: Hayekian conservatism councils a certain kind 
of epistemological humility.14  But just how humble ought we really to 
be?  We do, after all, have a large and growing amount of knowledge 
about the ways that social institutions work.  We know, for instance, that 
lightly-regulated capitalism tends to be a productive form of social 
organization, but that it also runs the risk of producing morally 
 14. HAYEK, supra note 2. 
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unacceptable economic inequalities.  Moreover, we can understand, at 
least in the general outlines, the selection mechanisms at work in various 
forms of institutional evolution.  We know that in a rigidly hierarchical, 
authoritarian form of social organization, institutions will tend to be 
selected on the basis of how well they serve the interests of the powerful.  
And we know that in a democracy, this problem is less worrisome, but is 
replaced by problems of a different, but well-documented sort. 
So where does this leave us?  We don’t know everything, but neither 
are we completely ignorant.  Should we be humble in our approach to 
institutional reform?  If so, what does this mean?  That we should make 
only small changes?  Along what dimensions should the “size” of a 
change be measured?  And if the evolutionary process by which our 
current institutions emerged was a process involving both the individual 
and collective choices of past generations, is it really even possible for 
us to “subvert” that process?  Isn’t anything we do just a continuation of 
it?  What would it mean, on this account, for us to act un-naturally? 
It is possible to develop a sophisticated version of conservatism that 
does bridge the gap between the natural law and post-Darwinian views 
of the universe.  But developing such an account requires answering 
hard questions such as these, and this is a task on which there remains 
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